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BANKRUPTCY-JURISDICTION OF A REFEREE IN PLENARY AcTioNs.-The trustee
in voluntary bankruptcy brought a bill in equity before the referee to set aside
an alleged fraudulent chattel mortgage given by the bankrupt to his brother,
under which the latter had obtained possession of the property. Objection to
the jurisdiction was overruled by the referee, sustained by the District Court,
and overruled again by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Held, that the refereehad no jurisdiction over a plenary suit. Weidhorn v. Levy (x920, U. S.) 45 Am.
B. P. 493, 40 Sup. Ct 534.
A referee as well as any other bankruptcy court may determine in a summary
proceeding all claims as to property in the custody of the trustee or any other
officer of the bankruptcy court. White v. Schloerb (igoo) 178 U. S. 542, 20 Sup.
Ct. 1007, 4 Am. B. R. 178; see Mueller v. Nugent ('9oi) 184 U. S. 1, 13, 22 Sup.Ct 269, 274; Collier, Bankruptcy (iith ed. 1917) 541. If the property is in thepossession of an adverse claimant, the question as to title can be determined in
a plenary action only. Louisville Trust Co. v. Comingor (I9o2) 184 U. S. 18, 22Sup. Ct. 293, 7 Am. B. R. 42i; see COMMENTS (1918) 5 VA. L. REv. 272. A few
courts have held that the referee has jurisdiction in plenary actions on the ground
that the fundamental purpose of the U. S. Bankruptcy Act was to place abankruptcy court in every county of the United States, and that refusingjurisdiction to the referee in such cases would violate the spirit of the Act.
In re Andrew I. Murphy (igoo, D. Mass.) 3 Am. B. R. 499; In re Shults (1904,
W. D. N. Y.) ii Am. B. R. 69o. This objection does not seem very forceful,
since under sec. 70 (e) state courts have concurrent jurisdiction in such plenary
suits and consequently the actions remain localized. The majority of lowerfederal courts refused to give the referee jurisdiction in plenary proceedings,
because the referee has not -the necessary machinery at hand for the conducting
of a plenary suit with its requirements of formal service of process, rule days,
etc. In re Carlile (igi2, D. N. C.) x99 Fed. 612, 29 Am. B. R. 373; In re Over-
holer (igog, D. N. D.) 23 Am. B. R. io; I Remington, Bankruptcy (2d ed. i915)
see. 545. The court in the instant case bases its decision on the ground that a
plenary suit is not a "proceeding" within the meaning of sec. 12 (i) of theGeneral Orders, but an entirely independent action. The decision in theinstant case finally settles this much disputed question in accordance with the
majority of the previous decisions in the lower federal courts.
CONTRACrs-AucTIONS-KNOWLEDGE BY PURCHASER OF CONDITIONS ANNOUNCLD
AT COMMENCEMENT OF SALE NOT NECESSARY.-The plaintiffs, through an auction-
eer, offered certain land for sale at public auction with certain restrictions. Theproperty was knocked down to the defendant who thereupon signed memoranda
of sale and gave his check in payment of ten per cent of the purchase price.
He later stopped payment on the check and refused to take the land, on -theground that he did not hear the terms read at the beginning of the sale, and
that he bought the land under the impression that the property was unrestricted.
There was some evidence that he was led on to bid by representations of the
auctioneer. The plaintiff brought this action for specific performance of the
contract. Held, that specific performance should not be granted. Josephy v.
Golden (192o, N. Y. Sup. Ct) 113 Misc. 284, 184 N. Y. Supp. 549.
It is generally considered that a contract is entered into at an auction sale
when the auctioneer knocks down the thing to be sold to the highest bidder.
I Williston, Contracts (I920) 39. The auctioneer is the agent of both vendor
and purchaser with sufficient authority to bind the vendee to the terms of the
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sale so as to satisfy the statute of frauds. Love v. Harris (I911) 156 N. C. 88,
72 S. E. I5o, Ann. Cas. 1912 D, io65, note; Sims v. Landray [1894] 2 Ch. 318.
The vendor, through the auctioneer, may impose such conditions as he sees fit
on the bidding, and control the sale in other ways. Farr v. John (1867) 23 Ia.
286. When the terms of the sale as announced by the auctioneer vary from the
terms as advertised in written or printed form, the courts are in conflict as to
whether parol evidence of the auctioneer's statements is admissible. NOTEs
(I915) I5 CoL. L. REv. 695, 696; Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 1128, note. This is closely
related to the question as to whether or not the purchaser is bound by the
conditions as announced at the commencement of the sale, when he did not know
of them. It has been held that a party may not be bound by conditions in a
contract on the ground that the mode of calling his attention to such conditions
did not amount to reasonable notice. Parker v. Ry. (1877, C. A.) 2 C. P. 416.
But in auction cases the better view binds the purchaser regardless of his knowl-
edge of the conditions announced. Clarke v. Maisch (i92o, Wis.) 177 N. W. Ii;
Kennell v. Boyer (19o9) 144 Ia. 3o3, 122 N. W. 941 ; Vanleer v. Fain (1845, Tenn.)
6 Humph. lO4, lO7; 2 R. C. L. 1123. Where, however, the purchaser has been
misled by the wrongful statements or misrepresentations of the auctioneer, and
has acted in reliance .ipon such misrepresentations, he may avoid the sale.
Roberts v. French (i8gi) 153 Mass. 6o, 26 N. E. 416; see Anson, Contract
(Corbin's ed. i9ig) 241. There are some cases also where the sale may be avoided
on the ground of mistake. But all such cases, where there is evidence of
misrepresentation or of mistake, are decided on their particular facts, according
to general principles governing contract relations. 34 L. R. A. (N. s.) 927, note.
In the principal case, unless the misrepresentation alleged was proven, it would
seem more in accord with the weight of authority to hold the purchaser to his
contract, even though it has to do with sale of land.
CORPORATIoNs-LIABiLITY FOR CAIm.-The defendant corporation was indicted
for manslaughter. The appellate court affirmed the decision sustaining the
indictment. Held, that the corporation could be indicted. State v. Lehigh
Valley Ry. (I92O, N. J.) Ii Atl. 257, affirming (1917, Sup. Ct.) 9o N. J. L. 372,
lO3 Atl. 685.
The doctrine of the criminal liability of a corporation is one of comparatively
recent development. Commonwealth z. Turnpike Co. (1823) 2 Va. Cas. 362
(indictment dismissed) ; State v. Great Works Co. (1841) 20 Me. 41 (liable for
criminal acts of nonfeasance, but not for those of misfeasance) ; Commonwealth
v. Proprietors of New Bedford (1854, Mass.) 2 Gray, 339 (liable for acts of
nonfeasance and misfeasance) ; State v. Morris & Essex Ry. (1852) 23 N. J. L.
36o. Recently indictments for manslaughter were quashed solely for lack of
precedent Commonwealth v. Punxsatawney Ry. (1899) 24 Pa. Co. Ct. 25; Reg.
v. Great West Laundry Co. (i9oo, Manitoba Q. B.) 3 Can. Cr. Cas. 514. The
difficulty of the courts is in finding a state of mind for a corporate entity,
particularly when a statute requires a specific intent. Even this latter obstacle
has been overcome in recent years. United State v. MacAndrews Co. (19o6, C.
C. S. D. N. Y.) 149 Fed. 823 (conspiracy); G'ant Bros. Construction Co-. V.
United States (1911) 13 Ariz. 388, 114 Pac. 955 (consciously encouraging alien
contract labor) ; but see Androscoggin Water Power Co. v. Bethel Co. (1874)
64 Me. 441; see Canfield, Corporate Responsibility for Crime (1914) 14 COL.
L. REV. 469. The liability for crime may be enforced on either of two theories.
(I), The doctrine of respondeat superior, it is true, is not applied where the
principal is an individual. I Clark & Skyles, Agency (19o5) sec. 52o. But it
is submitted that the reason is to be found in the disinclination of the law to
impose the odium of a crime upon an innocent person, and that the same policy is
less applicable to a corporation, which can only act through agents and which
YALE LAW JOURNAL
is directly represented by certain of its principal executive officers. (2) Its
liability for punitive damages for the torts of such officers might well be extended
to hold it criminally liable for the offenses committed by them in its behalf.
See Memphis Telephone Co. v. Cumberland Co. (1916, C. C. A. 6th) 231 Fed. 835(punitive damages for officers' torts). If, however, a crime is by statute punish-
able only by imprisonment, it is strong evidence that the legislature did not
intend to include corporations within the scope of the statute. Cf. Attorney
General v. Hamilton St. Ry. (1897) 24 Ont. App. i7o. But it is not by any means
conclusive. United States v. Young & H. Co. (igog, C. C. D. R. I.) 17o Fed. iio;
United States v. Van Schaick (19o4, C. C. S. D. N. Y.) 134 Fed. 592. It is
suggested that the obloquy of a conviction, although no punishment can be
administered, is yet of some force as a deterrent. It is interesting to note -that
no modern cases have been found where a defendant was freed solely on the
ground that the crime was completely without the scope of the corporate powers.
It would seem that the doctrine of the principal case should be supported.
CORPORATIONS-SuBscRIPTIOliS FOR STOcK-FAILURE OF CORPORATION TO OBSERVE
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS.-The plaintiff, as trustee in bankruptcy, brought an
action against the defendant to recover the balance claimed to be due on a sub-
scription for stock in the bankrupt corporation. The defendant demurred on the
ground that there was no allegation that the statute requiring the payment of
ten per cent cash at the time of the subscription to the stock had been fulfilled.
Held, (two judges dissenting) that the demurrer should be sustained. Mills v.
McNamee (1920, App. Div.) 184 N. Y. Supp. 613, affirming (1920, Sup. Ct.)
III Misc. 253, 18r N. Y. Supp. 285.
According to the later decisions, section 53 of the New York Stock Consolida-
tion Act applies only to subscriptions made after organization. Rogers v.
Baird, (1917) 18i App. Div. 927, 167 N. Y. Supp. 35. The object of the statute
is said to be to enable -the corporation to obtain sufficient working funds, and
hence a check or note will not validate the subscription. Van Schaick v. Mackin
(19o8) 129 App. Div. 335, 113 N. Y. Supp. 4o8; Hapgoods v. Lusch (1907) 123
App. Div. 27, io7 N. Y. Supp. 331. The statute is mandatory and cannot be
evaded by estoppel, waiver, or acquiescence. New York and Oswego Midland
Ry. v. Van Horn (1874) 57 N. Y. 473. Although the subscription is not accom-
panied by the required cash, a later payment has been held sufficient. Black
River & Utica Ry. v. Clarke (1862) 25 N. Y. 2o8. This seems to conflict with
the object avowed for the statute in some of the cases. Though the courts
may say the subscription is void without the payment of the required cash, and
despite the strong language of the statute ("No subscription shall be taken,
unless. . ."), where a stockholder has taken full benefits under the contract and
injustice would result if he were permitted to avail himself of the defense estab-
lished by the statute, he has been held bound, without having made the required
payment. Jeffrey v. Selwyn (1917) 220 N. Y. 77, 115 N. E. 275 (defendant,
a director, accepted dividends and sold his stock); see 6 A. L. R. iiI1, note;
see I Machen, Modern Law of Corporations (19o8) sec. 2oo. Such a rule is
analogous to the doctrine, prevailing in many of our state courts, which prevents
a party having enjoyed the full benefits of an ultra vires contract from repudiating
its burdens. Carson City Sav. Bank v. Carson City Elevator Co. (1892) 90 Mich.
550, 51 N. W. 641; see 2 Machen, op. cit., sec. 1O55 ff. It should be noted,
however, that the defense relied on in the instant case is not that the contract
in ultra vires, but a stronger ground-that the subscription claimed is opposed
to a specific statutory expression of public policy. A commissioner appointed
to take subscriptions cannot invalidate his own subscription on the ground that
the required amount has not been paid on it. Highland Turnpike v. McKean(1814, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) ii Johns. 98; Ryder v. Alton & Sangamon Ry. (1851)
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13 Il1. 516. The corporation, the "person" who was to receive the cash in the
instant case, is an entity distinct from its directors, but the defendant, by failing
to object to the violation of the statute, participated in a breach of duty toward
it, and should not be permitted to take advantage of such breach. Pittsburgh
Ry. v. Applegate (1882) 21 W. Va. 172; see (1915) 25 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 154.
If the statute was designed to secure good faith, then a defendant by doing, or
assisting in doing the very thing the statute aims to prevent, has the protection
of the courts thrown about him. It would seem that the defendant in the
principal case should be held liable on his subscription. For the power of a
trustee in bankruptcy to bring suit on an unpaid subscription for stock, see
(1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 403.
DAMAGES-INTEREST-UNLIQUIDATED DAMAGES PRFLUDE REcovaEY.-A contract
for the construction of an apartment house provided that if unpaid subcon-
tractors should file mechanics' -liens on the premises, the owners might hold
back enough money, otherwise due the general contractor, to secure the liens.
Because of the filing of such liens and because of claims for damages for
failure to complete the work on time and for defective work, the owners did not
pay the contractor. He recovered judgment nearly four years after the apart-
ment house was completed and delivered to the owners, but was ordered to pay
interest to the subcontractors and an allowance to the owners for defective work
and delay. Hcld, that the general contractor was not entitled, as against the
owners, to interest on either the amounts due the subcontractors or on the
general balance due, since it had been unliquidated. Wheeler and Gager, JJ.,
dissenting. Capitol City Lumber Co. v. Sudarsky (1920, Conn.) iii Atl. 349.
The law shows a steady development toward more frequent allowance of
interest. The early English rule permitted interest as a matter of law only
in suits on commercial paper and on contracts expressly, or by usage, providing
for it. Later this was extended by the St. 3 & 4 Win. IV (1833) c. 42 sec. 28,
29. Sedgwick, Damages (9th ed. 1912) 559. American courts have always
been more liberal, and look on interest as a necessary incident to the use of
money. There is great conflict among the authorities as to what types of
unliquidated claims interest should accrue on, if on any. In personal injury and
similar cases, where the extent of damages is peculiarly within the province
of the jury, no interest is allowed. Fell v. Union Pacific Ry. (1907) 32 Utah,
ioI, 88 Pac. ioo3. In actions for work and labor where the amount is unliqui-
dated, some courts have held that interest should be granted from the date of
completion of the work, others from the time of demand, while still others allow
no interest at all. Sullivan v. Nicoulin (igoi) 113 Iowa, 76, 84 N. W. 978 (date
of completion) ; Mulligan v. Smith (1904) 32 Colo. 404, 76 Pac. 1O63 (time of
demand); Swinnerton v. Argonaut Land Co. (i8g6) 112 Calif. 375, 44 Pac. 719
(interest not allowed). In building contract cases the weight of authority
seems to be in accord with the instant case. Macomber v. Bigelow (1899) 126
Calif. 9, 58 Pac. 312; Delafield v. Village of Westfield (igoi) i69 N. Y. 582,
62 N. E. lO95. The rule stated by the majority opinion seems to have as its
basis that the defendant may be excused from paying interest because of the
indefiniteness of the amount, whereas if the defendant could easily have computed
this amount upon which interest is to be figured, it should be allowed. Gilpatric
v. National Surety Co. (192o) 95 Conn. io, iio Att. 545. To make the rule
turn upon the ease of computation of the damages to be awarded is to make it
turn upon the defendant's conduct, i.e., the validity of his excuse, rather than
upon the proper theory of damages, namely, compensation to the plaintiff.
The rule stated by the minority, which grants interest whenever "the demands
of justice" require it, is hopelessly indefinite. In any exact system of justice
the breach of a right would be followed by a right to immediate redress. It
YALE LAW JOURNAL
is only the unavoidable delay of slow moving courts which prevents such redress.
Hence it is submitted that allowance should be made for such delay by way of
interest. But where the damages are both indefinite and to a large extent for
losses to be suffered in the future, as in personal injury actions, separate allowance
for interest should not be made, but the jury in making the general award of
damages should be allowed to consider the delay in payment. See (I920) 29
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 472. The present case, denying interest to the contractor,
who must pay interest to his subcontractors, while at the same time the defendants
were receiving rents and profits from their apartment house, seems unjustified.
EQUITY-DEas-REFoRmATON OF A VOLUNTARY CONVEYANcE-The plaintiffs,
heirs-at-law of one Gowan, brought a suit for the partition of a lot occupied
by the defendants, devisees of the grantee of the land from Gowan. The words
of inheritance necessary to pass a fee in that jurisdiction had been omitted from
the deed by mistake of the scrivener. The consideration recited in the deed
was love and affection and five dollars. The defendants prayed for the reforma-
tion of the instrument to include the necessary words of inheritance. The lower
court held that equity would not reform a voluntary conveyance. Held, that
there was sufficient consideration fo take the deed from the voluntary class,
with a dictum that equity as between the parties or their privies will reform a
scrivener's mistake even in a voluntary deed. Lawrence v. Clark (1920, S. C.)
zo4 S. E. 330.
The weight of authority appears to be contrary to the dictum in the principal
case. Smith v. Smith (1906) 80 Ark. 458, 97 S. W. 439; see note, io Ann. Cas.
523; Browne v. Gorman (igig, Tex. Civ. App.) 2o8 S. W. 385. The "pepper-
corn" theory of consideration seemed to prevail in these cases, but love and
affection alone seems not to justify reformation. Triesback v. Tyler (191i) 62
Fla. 580, 56 So. 947; Peters v. Priest (1918) I34 Ark. 16I, 203 S. W. IO42. Yet
love and affection and one dollar recited as consideration in a deed has supported
such a bill. Mason v. Moulden (1877) 58 Ind. I. Also where special services
have been rendered by a grantee to a grantor, members of the same family,
whether with a prior understanding to convey or not, reformation of
the deed has been granted. Finch v. Green (907) 225 Ill. 304, 80 N. E. 318.
In certain cases meritorious consideration, such as the moral duty of the grantor
to support the grantee, has enlisted the aid of equity in behalf of the grantee
for reforming the instrument. Partridge v. Partridge (r9o9) 220 Mo. 321, 119
S. W. 415; Huss v. Morris (x869) 63 Pa. 367; see 23 R. C. L. 346. But equity
will iot interfere where the claims of the parties are equally meritorious. Hout
v. Hout (187o) 20 Ohio, iig; Willey V. Hodge (899) 104 Wis. 8r, 8o N. W.
75. The cases show a tendency to carry out after his death the intention of the
grantor. Some courts have searched diligently for a consideration as in the
cases supra. Others as in the principal case have held flatly that a volunteer
can have reformation of a deed as against the heirs-at-law of the grantor.
Spencer v. Spencer (1917) 115 Miss. 71, 75 S. 770; McCabe v. O'Connor (i920,
S. D.) 176 N. W. 43. The person intended by the grantor should have the
gift rather than he who takes by a windfall. See Pound, Consideration in
Equity (1918) 13 ILL. L REV. 667, 676. But logically there seems to be no
reason for equity disturbing the legal title where neither party has given any-
thing for it and the equities are balanced.
EvIDENcE-CoNFESSIONS-ADMISSIBILITY WHEN ELICITmn By ADVICE TO TELL
THE TRuTH-While under arrest, the defendant was told by an officer that
"he better make sure of it and tell the truth." The defendant then confessed.
The lower court admitted this confession, but it was subsequently stricken out
and the jury was instructed to disregard it. The defendant moved for a new
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trial after a conviction of murder, partly on the grotnd that the admission of
the confession was prejudicial error which the subsequent ruling and instruction
could not cure. Held, that the judgment should be affirmed, the confession
being admissible and erroneously stricken out. People v. Foster (192o, Mich.)
179 N. W. 295.
It has been said that the privilege against self-crimination is the basis for
excluding confessions under certain circumstances. See Brant v. United States
(1897) 168 U. S. 532, 543, 18 Sup. Ct. 183, 187; 18 L. R. A. (N. s.) 772; 50 L. PL A.
(N. s.) xo77. But the true reason for exclusion, supported by the weight of modern
authority, is that the confession is testimonially untrustworthy. i Wigmore, Evi-
dence (19o4) secs. 822, 823; I P. C. L. 552. The confusion of authority seems due
to the variety of the tests employed. The customary expression that only voluntary
confessions are admissible would seem only to lead to the further inquiry of
what is meant by "voluntary" in this sense. 2 Chamberlayne, Evidence (i9i1)
sec. 1479. Courts usually exclude confessions induced by a threat or a promise,
by fear or hope, and the like. Robertson v. State (1917) 81 Tex. Cr. App. 378,
195 S. W. 6o2; People v. Brockett (1917) 195 Mich. i69, 161 N. W. 991. It
would seem that such tests are serviceable, but that the courts, in applying
them, should not lose sight of the true reason for exclusion. And, on principle,
the correct test seems to be: "was the inducement sufficient, by possibility, to
elicit an untrue acknowledgment of guilt?" Wigmore, op. cit., secs. 824, 825, 826;
see Wilson v. State (1917) ig Ga. App. 759, 766, 92 S. E. 309, 312. Since testi-
monial untrustworthiness is the real basis for exclusion, it would seem that a
fortiori a confession elicited by advice to tell the truth should be admissible. State
v. Williams (1911) 129 La. 215, 55 So. 769, Ann. Cas. 1913 B, 3o2, note. And it
should be admissible even though the advice is given by an officer after arrest.
Roszczyniala z. State (19o5) 125 Wis. 414, 1O4 N. W. 113; Huffinanr v. State
(igoi) 13o Ala. 89, 3o So. 394; contra, Regina v. Doherty (1874) 13 Cox C. C. 23.
It should only be excluded if the circumstances show that the defendant was
induced, not to tell the truth, but to tell such a story as the authorities would
accept, and thereby to make a false confession. Chamberlayne, op. cit. sec.
1519; Wigmore, op. cit. sec. 832. Each case obviously must be decided on its
own facts, but the decision in the instant case seems clearly sound.
MORTGAGES-STATUTE OF F.AUDs-P. &oL AGREEMENT TO EXTEND THE TIME OF
REDEMPTION.-The purchaser of mortgaged premises at a foreclosure sale agreed
orally with the mortgagor prior to the expiration of the statutory period to
extend the time of redemption. The latter remained in possession and made
several payments. Shortly before the end of the statutory period he executed a
second mortgage for almost the amount due on the first, but did not redeem.
The purchaser procured a sheriff's deed, but did not attempt to enter until three
years later. During this time the mortgagor continued in possession and made
payments in addition to the rent. Held, that the payments and the execution of
the second mortgage were sufficient part performance to take the agreement out
of the operation of the statute of frauds. Coates v. Dortdc (i92o, Ark.) 224
S. W. 721.
Where part performance is relied on to take an oral contract for the sale of
land out of the statute of frauds, an unequivocal act is required. Payment of
even the entire consideration is generally held not sufficient. See 5 Pomeroy,
Equitable Remedwes (2d ed. igig) sec. 2246. Nor is continuance in possession
sufficient unless accompanied by an act explicable only on the basis of a new
contract. Wills v. Stradling (1797, Ch.) 3 Ves. Jr. 378. Even in those jurisdic-
tions where relief is given on the theory of equitable estoppel, an unequivocal
act is required ix% addition. Lechenger v. Merchants' National Bank (i9o6,
Tex. Civ. App.) c6 S. W. 638. Measured by this test, the instant agreement is
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unenforceable. The execution- of the second mortgage suggests a final effort to
redeem according to law rather than an agreement for an extension. But
equity with its usual tenderness for the mortgagor has adopted without qualifica-
tion the doctrine of equitable estoppel in dealing with agreements to extend the
time of redemption where the mortgagor has been "lulled into false security"
and relaxed his efforts to redeem. Schroeder v. Young (1896) 161 U. S. 334,
16 Sup. Ct 512; Taggart v. Blair (i9o5) 215 IIl. 339, 74 N. E. 372. The extension
may be for a definite or an indefinite period, which the courts construe as a
reasonable time. Diggins v. Axtell (1915) 196 I1. App. 480; Dow v. Bradley
(1913) iio Me. 24g, 85 At. 896. But since the agreement is merely a qualified
waiver of the mortgagee's power of forfeiture, the mortgagor is held strictly
to its terms. Turpie v. Lowe (1902) 158 Ind. 314, 62 N. E. 484. Courts of law
have also given effect to it where the mortgagee has conveyed to a bona fide
purchaser by allowing a recovery of the value of the equity in a quasi-contractual
action. Dow v. Badley, supra. The decision in the instant case is sound, but
the reason would seem to lie rather in equitable estoppel than in part performance
of contracts relating to land. Still another reason might have been found in
the acceptance of payments after foreclosure and receipt of the deed. This has
been held to reopen the foreclosure and re-invest in the mortgagor the power of
redemption. Lounsbury v. Norton, (189o) 59 Conn. 17o, 22 At. 153; see 2
Jones, Mortgages (7th ed. 1915) sec. 949a.
MUNIcIPAL CORPORATIONS-EsToPPEL To DENY GRANT OF FRANCHISE To TELE-
PHONE CoMPANY.-The plaintiff, a municipal corporation, sought to have the
defendant telephone company enjoined from maintaining its wires, etc., along
the streets of the city. Ten years before this suit was brought, the defendant
had presented a petition to the board of trustees of the then town, asking for the
privilege of erecting its system. The petition had been approved by the individ-
ual members of the board, but no formal action was ever taken. A statute
provided that consent of the municipal authorities must be obtained before such
a company could operate in any city. Held, that the injunction should not issue,
since the city was estopped to deny that consent had been given. Bradley,
P. J. dissenting. City of Mountain View v. Farmer's Telephone Co. (1920, Mo.
App.) 224 S. W. I55.
It is well settled that where a municipal corporation has no power to grant
a franchise to a public service corporation, the city will not be estopped to
question the validity of a grant so made. State v. Monroe (1905) 40 Wash. 545,
82 Pac. 888; Smith v. Westerly (1896) 19 R. I. 437, 35 At. 526. Where the
municipality has the power and it is claimed that it has been invalidly exercised,
the cases may be divided into two groups. If no particular method of making
the grant is prescribed by statute, a municipal corporation may estop itself just
as an individual. Missouri River Telephone Co. v. Mitchell (19o8) 22 S D. i9i,
116 N. W. 67. Where the method is prescribed, however, there is a variety of
decisions. Some courts lay down the strict rule that the statute must be complied
with and that therefore there can be no estoppel. Holland Realty and Power
Co. v. St. Louis (192o, Mo.) 221 S. W. 51; Toronto Electric Light Co. v. Toronto
19g17, P. C.] A. C. 84; Detroit v. Railwy Co. (1894, C. C. E. D. Mich.) 6ol
Fed. 161. On the other hand, it is held, that where from the facts of the case
justice requires that the doctrine be applied, the courts will do so even against
a municipal corporation. Hagerstown v. Hagerstown R. Co. (1914) I23 Md.
183, 91 Atl. I7)); London Mills v. White (9o4) 208 IlL 289, 70 N. E. 313; 3
Dillon, Municipal Corporations (Sth ed. 1911) secs. 1194, 1242. Mere acquies-
cence does not constitute sufficient basis for application of the doctrine. Bangor
v. Bay City Traction Co. (1907) 147 Mich. 165, Iio N. W. 49o; Morris and
Essex Ry. v. Newark (1855) io N. J. Eq. 352. But where there has been reliance
RECENT CASE NOTES
on a positive act of the municipal authorities, as in the instant case, courts will
hold that the city is estopped. People z2. Union Gas Co. (1913) 260 Ill. 392, 103
N. E. 245; Hagerstown, v. Hagerstown Ry., supra. Although this decision is
supported by much authority, it would seem that the better rule is laid down in
Holland Realty and Power Co. v. St. Louis, supra, since the granting of such
a privilege should be closely supervised.
PRAcricE-Dixcrc VmuxRcTs IN CRIMINAL CASES-JUDGE AND JURY-INSTRUC-
TIONS AS To LAW IN EFFECT DIRECTING A VEilcT.-The defendant and his
assistant admitted moving his loan office into Virginia, maintaining a reception
office in the District of Columbia, and conducting as many as 2o patrons a day
across the line by automobile, in order to evade the statute regulating the
business in the District. The judge instructed the jury that this admitted
course of dealing constituted a violation of the law; that to find for the defen-
dant would be contrary to the law and the evidence and a violation of their oath;
that by law he had no power to direct a verdict in a criminal case, but that what
he said amounted to that. Held, (four justices dissenting) that whatever
wrong the defendant may have suffered was purely formal, as from the admitted
facts there was no doubt of his guilt, and the judge always has the privilege of
telling the jury what the law is upon a certain state of facts, even where the
facts are agreed. Horning v. District of Columbia (1920, U. S.) 41 Sup. Ct. 53.
It is an elementary proposition of law that the court cannot direct a verdict
of guilty in a criminal action. Breese v. United States (19ol, C. C. A. 4th)
io8 Fed. 804. But it is the prevailing doctrine that the jury are bound, even in
criminal trials, to follow and apply the law as laid down by the court. Duffy v.
The Peoptg (1863) 26 N. Y. 588; Sparf and Hansen. v. United States (1895)
156 U. S. 51, 64, 15 Sup. Ct. 273; 2 Thompson, Trials (2d ed. 1912) sec. 2i33. On
the other hand, the jury can, if they see fit, contrary to their moral duty and
the obligations of their oath, disregard the evidence before them, and the law
as expounded to them by the court, and return a verdict of not guilty. See 84
J. P. 506; Thompson, op. cit. See also COMMENT (1921) 19 MIcH. L. RFv. 325.
In the principal case, where the facts showing the defendant's guilt were undis-
puted, these two principles of law came into direct conflict. The modern tendency
is toward holding that an instruction correctly stating the law and warning the
jury against a finding contrary to it, is not a direction of a verdict of guilty,
though it in effect does direct the jury to find the defendant guilty. Nicholson
v. Commonwealth (1879) 91 Pa. 39o; State v. Lackawanna Ry. (1912) 82 N. J. L.
747, 82 Atl. 851. It is submitted that it is proper for the court to warn the jury
against exercising their power of disregarding the law and the evidence in
violation of their moral duty, and that no substantive rights of the defendant are
violated, as it is not to be presumed that a jury will find in opposition to the
law from mere whim, caprice, or prejudice, for all their power to do so. People
v. Neumann (i8gi) 85 Mich. 98, 48 N. W. 290.
PRACTICE-INDICTMENT-JURY-PRESENCE OF UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS IN GRAND
JURY ROOM AS GROUND FOR QUASHING INDICTMENT.-The defendants, having
been indicted for unlawfully appropriating funds of a company of which they were
members, moved to quash the indictment on two grounds: (I) it was found
on hearsay evidence given by a committee of a previous grand jury; (2) the
present grand jury was influenced by this committee, which came as a delegation
to urge action on the part of the jury. Held, that the indictment should be
quashed, on the second ground only. State v. Ernster (1920, Minn.) 179 N. W.
640.
The investigations of the grand jury are clothed in the utmost secrecy and
indeed some courts have held that, in order that this secrecy may be complete,
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they will not inquire into the amount or kind of evidence which produced the
indictment. State v. Fasset (1844) i6 Conn. 457, 471; State v. Comer (19o2)
157 Ind. 6ii, 62 N. E. 452 But since the innovation of rules limiting the grand
jury in their reception of evidence, it has logically followed that the proceedings
may be inquired into with reference to the sufficiency or legality of the evidence.
United States v. Farrington (i88i, N. D. N. Y.) 5 Fed. 343; see 4 Wigmore,
Evidence (i9o5) sec. 2364. If the court should find that there was some compe-
tent evidence, the mere fact that incompetent evidence was admitted will not be
sufficient ground to quash, as a valid indictment may have been found on the
competent evidence. People v. Rice (i919) 2o6 Mich. 644, 173 N. W. 495;
see 12 R. G L. IO4o. Where, however, the evidence is utterly insufficient, the
indictment will be quashed. United States v. Silverthorne (i92o, W. D. N. Y.)
265 Fed. 853; see 2 Wharton, Criminal Procedure (Ioth ed. i918) sec. 1291.
In the instant case it does not appear that the indictment was founded solely on
the hearsay evidence, and so the court correctly decided that the indictment should
not be quashed on the first ground. See 47 L. R. A. (N. s.) I 2o7, note. The
argument dealing with the incompetency of witnesses before a grand jury as
ground for quashal has resulted in a diversity of authority. See (I916) 16
CoL L. REV. 158; (915) 28 HARV. L. REV. 326. It has been held that where a
witness was not sworn, the indictment should be quashed even if the jurors were
not actually influenced. State v. Wetzel (1914) 75 W. Va. 7, 83 S. E. 68. And
again the court held it to be sufficient ground to quash that a private attorney
was present, even if at the request of the county attorney. Hartgraves 7).
State (1911) 5 Okla. Cr. App. 266, 114 Pac. 343. But the logical rule would seem
to be the one that is generally followed where there is incompetent evidence,
viz., if there were some competent witnesses present, that is sufficient to sustain
the indictment, even though incompetent witnesses were also present State v.
Shreve (897) 137 Mo. I, 38 S. W. 548. In the instant case, not only were
incompetent witnesses present, but also an attempt was made by them as a
delegation to influence the finding of the grand jury. Here also there is a
diversity of opinion, as it has been held that where a witness did not have any
actual knowledge of the case but merely came to urge the finding of an indict-
ment, his conduct fell far short of being ground for quashal. State v. Bacon
(I9OO) 77 Miss. 366, 27 So. 563. The line must be drawn somewhere, however,
and it surely seenis unjust to the accused to have witnesses come as a body to
urge the finding of an indictment when the facts themselves may warrant such
action. Considering also that the chief function of the grand jury is the impar-
tial investigation of all the facts in a particular case, outside influence, especially
where it is intended to affect the finding, should be entirely excluded. The
instant case, therefore, is apparently sound. See 14 R. C. L. 205. An additional
reason for this conclusion is found in the provisions of Minn. Gen. St. 1913,
sec. gi8o.
PROPERTY-TENANCY IN COMMON-DEED oF ENIRE ESTATE IN SEVERALTY BY
ONE CO-TENANT TO A STRANGER-ADVERSE PoSSESSION UNDER SUCH A DEED.The
plaintiffs' and the defendant's grantors respectively owned land as tenants in
common. The plaintiffs' grantor executed to them a deed ptarporting to convey
the entire interest in severalty in a specific parcel thereof. The defendant claims
under a deed of the other co-tenant's interest. For a longer time than the statu-
tory period the plaintiffs grazed their cattle on the land during the grazing season;
but did not prevent the defendant or his grantor from grazing their cattle. Little
use was made of the land during the remainder of the year. The plaintiffs
brought an action to quiet their title to the parcel in question, claiming title
thereto in severalty by adverse possession. Held, that the plaintiffs were entitled
to the relief sought, since entry under their deed is presumed to have been adverse
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and possession thereafter for the statutory period gave them complete title.
O'Banion et al. v. Simpson (192o, Nev.) 191 Pac. lO83.
Possession by one co-tenant is in law considered to be for the benefit of the
other co-tenants. Miller v. Powers (1919) 184 Ky. 417, 212 S. W. 453; see
Schleuter v. Reinking (igig, Iowa) 173 N. W. I8. To rebut this so-called
presumption, notice of any adverse claim must be brought home to the other
co-tenants, either actually or by notorious and unequivocal acts. Berger v.
Horsfield (1919) 188 App. Div. 649, 176 N. Y. Supp. 854; Stiles v. Haw'kins
(1918, Tex. Sup. Ct.) 207 S. W. 89. A co-tenant can convey no greater
interest than his own, and any deed purporting to convey more is inoperative
as against those co-tenants who do not join therein. Pastine v. Altman (1919)
93 Conn. 707, IO7 AUt. 803; see (1919) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 248; Le Vee v.
Le Vee (gi91) 93 Oregon 370, 382, 183 Pac. 773, 774. Such a deed of itself
raises no presumption of an adverse claim, even though it is recorded and the
grantee pays all the taxes for the statutory period. White v. Beckwith (1892)
62 Conn. 79,25 AtI. 4oo; see Pickens v. Stout (191o) 67 W. Va. 422, 432, 68 S. E.
354, 359. In North Carolina, despite a seven years statute of limitations, neither
a co-tenant nor his grantee can defeat the interests of other co-tenants except
by adverse possession for twenty years. Hicks v. Bullock (1887) 96 N. C.
164, I S. E. 629; Mott v. Land Co. (19o8) 146 N. C. 525, 6o S. E. 423. This
rule seems arbitrary. By the instant case and the great weight of authority,
a stranger to whom a co-tenant purports to convey the entire interest in severalty
has the power to invest complete title in himself by adverse possession through
acts less notorious and unequivocal than would be required by his grantor.
Foulke v. Bond (1879) 41 N. J. L .527; Clarke v. Dirks (1916) 178 Iowa, 335,
16o N. W. 31; see 32 L. R. A. (N. s.) 702, note. It appears more logical, how-
ever, as well as just that such a stranger should be compelled to give as unequiv-
ocal evidence as a co-tenant of an adverse claim to a greater interest than the
co-tenant had. See Hamershlag v. Duryea (1899) 38 App. Div. 130, 133, 56
N. Y. Supp. 615, 618.
PROPERTY-WATERS AND WATERCOURsEs-ExcLUsivE RIGHT OF A RIPARIAN
OWNER TO HUNT ANIMALS IN NAVIGABLE STPsA.-The plaintiff was the owner
of land bordering a navigable stream and claimed ownership of its bed to the
middle. The defendant had placed traps at the bottom of the stream for the
purpose of catching muskrats and had succeeded in trapping some of considerable
value. The plaintiff sought to enjoin this practice. Held, that the plaintiff was
entitled to the relief sought, and to the exclusive privilege of trapping the
aquatic animals in and upon the waters covering the soil submerged to the
thread of the stream. Johnson v. Burghorn (192o, Mich.) 179 N. W. 225.
The instant case involves two questions. The first relates to the ownership of
the soil underlying public or navigable fresh waters; the second to the rights
of the owner to hunt aquatic animals in waters covering that soil. The authori-
ties on the first question are in great conflict. Some states, following the
common-law rule, hold that the ownership of the beds of non-tidal waters,
though navigable in fact, is in the riparian owners. Fulton v. State (I911) 200
N. Y. 4o0, 94 N. E. i99; Donovan etc. Co. v. Hope Lumber Co. (i912, C. C. A'.
9th) 194 Fed. 643. Others hold that title in the case of all public waters is in
the state. Hammond v. Shepard (igoo) 186 Ill. 235, 57 N. E. 867. The constitu-
tions of some states so provide. City of New Whatcom v. Fairhaven Land Co.
(igoi) 24 Wash. 493, 64 Pac. 735. Where the title to the bed of a navigable
stream is in the state, the public is privileged to fish and hunt fowl and animals
inhabiting the waters. Ex parte Bailey (i9O9) 155 Calif. 472, 1o Pac. 441;
Ainsworth v. Munoskong Hunting Club (19o8) 153 Mich. 185, 116 N. W. 99A
But no one, whether riparian owner or not, has a right to the materials in the
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soil unless obtained by grant from the state. Goodwin v. Thompson (1885, Tenn.)
I Lea. D. State v. Akers (1914) 92 Kan. i69, 14o Pac. 637. And some courts
have held that the state has no -power of alienation of any interest in the soil of
such streams, inasmuch as the title to such soil is held in trust for the people.
State v. Korrer (1914) 127 Minn. 6o, 148 N. W. 617; Rossmiller v. State (1902)
114 Wis. 169, 89 N. W. 839. Where the title to the soil of non-tidal waters is in
the riparian owner, it is generally held that the public is not privileged to fish
and hunt aquatic animals. Decker v. Baylor (i8go) 133 Pa. 168, 19 Ati. 351;
Griffith v. Holman (i9oo) 23 Wash. 347, 63 Pac. 239; Adams v. Pease (1818)
2 Conn. 481. But on the other -hand it has been held that the right of fishing
is incident to that of navigation and therefore public. Diana Shooting Club v.
Hasting (1914) 156 Wis. 261, 145 N. W. 816; Forestier v. Johnson (1912) 164
Calif. 24, 127 Pac. 156. The principal case, while following the apparent trend
of authority relative to the rights of riparian owners whose ownership of the
beds of streams is recognized, would seem to have carried this doctrine to a
point where the sanction of public policy is very doubtful.
PROPERTY-WATERS AND WATERCOURSES-FLODS-RPARIAN OWNER'S RIGHT TO
PROTECT HIS PROPERTY BY EMBANKENT.-The parties owned land in New
Zealand upon opposite banks of a river, whose waters periodically in times of
flood overflowed the bank at a point on the defendant's property, spread over it
without any defined channel, and ultimately found their way back to the river.
To exclude these waters he built an embankment, and this resulted in an increased
flooding of the plaintiff's farm. The latter thereupon brought this action for
damages and for the removal of the obstruction. Held, that the plaintiff was
without remedy, since he had failed to establish the existence of any flood
channel or ancient and rightful course for the flood waters over the defendant's
land. Gerrard v. Crowe (1920, P. C.) 37 T. L. R. no.
It is elementary law that a riparian owner is entitled to have a natural water-
course flow ut currere solebat. Surface water, on the other hand, may be
obstructed in most jurisdictions. See (1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 686. In
the United States, flood water is generally considered to be a part of the water-
course, unless it becomes severed from the stream, spreading out over the land
never to return; and its flow may not be obstructed to the injury of other riparian
owners except at times of unprecedented flood. Uhl v. Ry. (1904) 56 W. Va.
494, 49 S. F 378; Town v. Hicks (igog) 23 Okla. 684, 102 Pac. 79. A few states
hold that it becomes surface water when it spreads out over the land without
any fixed channel or definite current. Gobin v. Piety (192o, Ind.) 125 N. E. 655.
The reason for these decisions seems to be that a contrary doctrine in those states
would render useless large portions of their richest soil. See Taylor v. Fickas
(1878) 64 Ind. 167, 175. In localities such as the Mississippi Valley, where
the floods are so extraordinary and would cover the land where whole cities
now stand, it is held that, for the protection of life and property, this land
cannot be considered as a part of the flood channel, and any owner may protect
his lands by dikes or levees without liability to others. Cubbins v. Commissioners
(I916) 241 U. S. 351, 36 Sup. Ct. 671; Smeltzer v. City (1914) 246 Pa. 560, 92
Atl. 702. A riparian owner may protect his land from any change in the course
of the stream, or from encroachment by the sea. Barnes z. Marshal (1886)
68 Calif. 569, io Pac. 115; Rex v. Paghan (1828, K. B.) 8 B. & C. 355. And if
it appear that a structure previously erected by the plaintiff so changed the flow
that the defendant's embankment merely served to protect his land from this
added peril and was not obstructing the ancient and rightful course of the flood
waters, the -plaintiff may not complain if his lands are thereby inundated.
Trafford 'v. Rex (1832, Exch.) 8 Bing. 204; Wilhelm v. Burleyson (i8go) 1o6
N. C. 381, 11 S. E. 59o. The waters of artificial canals are governed by principles
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that differ from those which are applied to natural watercourses. Neild v. Ry.
(1874) L. R. IO Exch. 4. The leading English case holds that nature provides
a flood channel for every stream, and that this may not be obstructed to the
injury of others; it is clearly not stated that the channel must be well defined.
Menzies v. Breadalbane (1828, H. L.) 3 Bligh (N. R.) 414- With one exception,
which is cited in the principal case, there seems to be no English case since 1828
that cannot be distinguished under the principles stated in this note. Drainage
Board v. Ry. (1912, K. B.) io6 L. T. 429. That case relies for its authority
upon Rex v. Pagham, supra, which is a case of encroachment by the sea, and is
governed by different principles. It is believed that the principal case cannot be
supported on existing English authority, nor does it seem reasonable to hold
that flood water overflowing the bank and later returning to the stream is not a
part of the stream. The way which nature has provided for the flow is the
watercourse, and water flowing in that course is not to be obstructed as mere
surface water. See Cairo Ry. v. Brevoort (1894, C. C. D. Ind.) 62 Fed. 129, 133.
SALES-PUBLIC WATER WORKS-IMPLIED WARRANTY OF PURITY OF WATER
SoLD.-The defendant city sold water to its inhabitants. The plaintiff, a purchaser,
contracted typhoid from the water, and brought this action, alleging an
implied warranty of purity. The defendant demurred. Held, (two judges
dissenting) that there was no implied warranty of purity in a sale of water.
Canavan v,. City of Mechanicville (192o) 229 N. Y. 473, 128 N. E. 882.
This case is supported by almost all the little authority there is. See Green v.
Ashland Water Co. (1898) IOI Wis. 258, 77 N. W. 722; Hayes v. Torrington
Water Co. (1914) 88 Conn. 6og, 92 Atl. 4o6; Hamilton v. Madison Water Co.
(1917) 116 Me. 157, Ioo Atl. 659. One case tending the other way, allowed an
injunction to prevent the water company from collecting water rent where impure
water had been supplied, irrespective of negligence, Brymer v. Butler Co.
(1895) 172 Pa. 490, 33 Atl. 707. A municipal corporation which supplies water
is held to the same liability as is a private water company. Flutmus v. City of
Newport (1917) 175 Ky. 817, 194 S. W. 1O39; Oklahoma City v'. Hoke (1919)
75 Okla. 211, 182 Pac. 692. Liability in these cases was formerly denied on the
ground that there was no sale. Green v. Ashland Co., supra. But this metaphysi-
cal distinction has not survived in the practical twentieth century. Jersey City v.
Harrison (1904) 71 N. J. L. 69, 58 Atl. ioo; see Oakes Co. v. New York (1912)
206 N. Y. 221, 228, 99 N. E. 540, 541. There seems to be the same relation
between the parties as in the sale of foodstuffs. Jones v. Mt. Holly Water Co.
(1915) 87 N. J. L. lo6, 93 Atl. 860. In this regard it is a very nice question as
to the effect of the sales act on the American theory of an absolute liability on an
implied warranty because of a high regard for human life. The words of the
statute require actual or implied notice of the particular use for which the
article is bought, and actual or implied reliance upon the seller's skill; it is
still an open question whether or not this is merely a codification of the common
law. See Perkins, Unwholesome Food as a Source of Liability (192o) 5 IowA
L. BULL. 103; COMMENTS (920) 29 YALE; LAW JOURNAI, 782 It has been held
necessary that the goods be such that the seller have an opportunity to examine.
Cf. Ward v. Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. (i"i8) 231 Mass. 90, 120 N. E. 225;
Bigelow v. Me. Central Ry. (1912) Iio Me. io5, 85 Adt. 396. When a house-
holder contracts for water, he commonly does so for purposes of securing
a drinking supply. But is water nearer to nature and less under the seller's
control than pork? Has modern science developed microscopic inspection so that
it is practical for a city continuously to inspect its water supply for typhoid?
Answering that there is no control, the instant case decides that without control
on the seller's part there is no implied reliance on his skill, and that the words
of the sales act make reliance necessary.
